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Revealing Violence: Assessing the Effect of Viral Images on State Punitive
Aesthetics
Justin Hyland*
“For, after all, executions I can find almost anywhere.”
—Robert Cover, Violence and the World1
INTRODUCTION
On May 25, 2020, Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin knelt on George
Floyd’s neck until Floyd could no longer breathe.2 The encounter played out publicly—
an eight-minute-and-forty-second execution captured in its entirety by bystander cell
phone videos and nearby security cameras.3 The footage disseminated rapidly. Within
hours, the chilling scene had traveled across social media platforms to more
traditional news outlets into American households.4 Public response is welldocumented. In the days that followed, demonstrators marched on Minneapolis’ 3rd
Precinct, igniting an unprecedented wave of civilian protest that lasted through the
summer months.5 As police violence remains endemic in American society, public
unrest continues to foment.6
Nine months later, Brandon Bernard was put to death by lethal injection at a
federal penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.7 The lead-up to the execution had been
tortuous and controversial. Bernard had spent two decades on death row for crimes
committed as an eighteen-year-old.8 In the intervening years, Bernard’s advocates
had articulated a series of mitigating factors, including proof that the state had
withheld exculpatory evidence and elicited false testimony.9 Nevertheless, the United
*
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Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1624 (1986).
See How George Floyd Died, and What Happened Next, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd.html.
See id.
See Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests: A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.28, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html.
See id.
During the writing of this paper, Ma’Khia Bryant and Andrew Brown Jr. were killed by law enforcement.
Both deaths ignited protests in their respective cities of Columbus, Ohio, and Elizabeth City, North
Carolina. Mark Osborne, Marlene Lenthang & Sabina Ghebremedhin, 16-Year-Old-Girl Fatally Shot by
Police in Ohio, ABC NEWS (Apr. 21, 2021), https://abcnews.go.com/US/16-year-girl-fatally-shot-policeohio/story?id=77198246; Adeel Hassan, What We Know About the Killing of Andrew Brown Jr. in North
Carolina, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/28/us/andrew-brown-jr-shootingnorth-carolina.html.
See Christina Carrega, Brandon Bernard Executed After Supreme Court Denies Request for a Delay, CNN
(Dec. 11, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/12/10/politics/brandon-bernard-executed/index.html.
See id.
See Bernard v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 504, 504–07 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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States Supreme Court denied his stay of execution.10 Although Bernard’s death
received media attention, it did not inspire the type of public backlash incited by
Floyd’s murder. There were no street demonstrations or transformative protest
movements. Reformers did not call for the immediate abolition of the judiciary. Why
is it that these two killings—both ostensibly legal11—provoked such different public
reactions? The disparate response, I argue, is best explained by the way each death
was conveyed.
The American regime of legal violence operates by way of obfuscation. Legal
violence is everywhere, though not always recognized as such. A state officer affects a
street-corner cavity search. The judge speaks and someone is confined to bondage.
These occurrences—individually traumatic and unquestionably violent—are the
quotidian expressions of our criminal justice system. We understand them as
procedure, not pain. They exist in a separate psychic realm from criminal violence,
attached securely to conceptions of justice and retribution. Misrecognition of this type
is no accident. For the State to punish legally, it must do so in ways that the public
accepts as legitimate.12 This legitimacy, in turn, is predicated on how effectively the
State obscures the violence of its own action. By concealing human bodies, physical
pain, and personal agency, the State communicates that it is a rational actor, one
consistent with prevailing liberal values.13 Viral images of police killings upend this
project. Unmoored from the State’s curation, such images denaturalize the regime of
legal violence. Viral images, which can be distributed by anyone with a camera or
cellphone, democratizes how violence is represented, and threatens to erode the
relationship between the State and the public. Put simply, legal violence has become
unmasked.
This Article analyzes the two paradigmatic forms of American State violence—
capital punishment and police killings. Historically, these twin uses of power have
served distinct, but complementary, functions. Capital punishment is a deeply
symbolic practice designed to both educate and reinforce community values through
the removal of deviant outsiders.14 Police killings, by contrast, are often unplanned
and instantaneous. They bring sudden lethal force upon an individual to control
criminal or disfavored populations. This Article relies on two simple premises. First,
the State must render these killings “legal” by concealing the violence it inflicts.
Second, recent viral images disturb this project by revealing the violence inherent in
state action. This Article’s purpose is to provide an analytic and theoretic account of
these processes in action.
Part I introduces the concept of legal violence. Legal violence, as imagined here,
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See id.
During the writing of this article, Derek Chauvin was tried and convicted for the murder of George Floyd. See
Bill Chappell, Derek Chauvin is Sentenced to 22 ½ Years for George Floyd’s Murder, NPR (June 25, 2021),
https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/06/25/1009524284/derek-chauvinsentencing-george-floyd-murder. Although this individual killing was subsequently adjudged as “illegal,” the
prosecution of police officers for use of lethal force remains exceedingly rare. Id.
Cover, supra note 1, at 1608.
See Jürgen Martschukat, Nineteenth-Century Executions as Performances of Law, Death, and Civilization,
in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 49, 55 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005)
(discussing the methods in which Western states perform rationality through punitive expression).
See generally DAVID GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY (1990); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF
LABOUR IN SOCIETY (1893).
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involves the official distribution of punishment by state actors to achieve various
social functions. These practices are the dialectic products of an ongoing negotiation
between the State and the public.15 To maintain its monopoly over legal violence, the
State must transmit violent acts through an intelligible medium. In modern times,
this involves anesthetization and concealment. The public is more likely to tolerate
violence communicated as procedural, rational, and necessary. To realize this end, the
State must disguise violence as something else entirely.
Part II explores the first pillar of legal violence—capital punishment. This
section briefly traces the history of the American death penalty, recounting its
transformation from public spectacle to private procedure.16 The rest of this section is
dedicated to describing what this Article deems “concealment technologies.”
Concealment technologies are the various processes, aesthetics, and systems by which
the State renders violence both intelligible and palatable to the broader public. In
doing so, the State retains monopoly control over force and is afforded greater latitude
to carry out social functions.
Part III investigates concealment in the context of police killings. Specifically,
this section assesses the ways “proceduralization,” instantaneity, and narrative have
historically obscured violence committed by law enforcement. As with capital
punishment, these technologies work to render violence palatable to public audiences,
thereby naturalizing the existing terrain of state force.
Part IV argues that viral images of police killings are destabilizing the State’s
concealment project. These images reintroduce unmediated state violence to the
mainstream public through rapid dissemination across media platforms. Removed
from state control, such depictions diffuse concealment technologies and realign the
perceptual framework in which legal violence is understood. The result is state
violence reframed. In the eyes of the public, police transform from social guardians to
vigilante outlaws. Judges become gatekeeping apologists rather than arbiters of truth
and justice. This perceptual shift fractures communicative ties between the State and
the public.
Part V examines stakeholder responses to this communication breakdown. On
the one hand, vast public coalitions have mobilized against state violence at
unprecedented rates.17 These protest movements—emblemized most famously by
Black Lives Matter—are calling for broad institutional reform.18 On the other hand,
reinstitution of the federal death penalty19 can be seen as the State’s attempt to
15
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Id. at 33. (“Penal sanctions or institutions are not simply dependent variables at the end of some finite line
of social causation. Like all social institutions, punishment interacts with its environment, forming part of
the mutually constructing configuration of elements which make up the social world.”).
See generally Annulla Linders, The Execution Spectacle and State Legitimacy: The Changing Nature of the
American ExecutionAudience, 1833-1937, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 607, 616–22 (2002).
See Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement in
U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floydprotests-crowd-size.html.
See Jonathan Allen & Trevor Hunnicutt, U.S. Protestors Call to ‘Defund the Police.’ What Would That Look
Like?,REUTERS (June 5, 2020, 12:59 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-minneapolis-police-defundingexplaine/u-s- protesters-call-to-defund-the-police-what-would-that-look-like-idUSKBN23C2I9.
Federal Government to Resume Capital Punishment After Nearly Two Decade Lapse, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (July 25,
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-government-resume-capital-punishment-after-nearly-two-decadelapse.
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rechannel violence through legal mediums. Finally, law enforcement has attempted to
stifle the dissemination of police misconduct through the physical intimidation of
journalists and bystanders.20 Although the current legal landscape is deeply
unsettled, this Article argues that destabilization can provide sightlines to new
realities. Unmasking state violence allows us to reconsider its utility in the first
instance.
I. LEGAL VIOLENCE
The destruction of physical bodies is capable of complex and contradictory
meanings.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of law. Violence, legally speaking, is
multivocal. It is simultaneously the crime and the punishment. To the individual,
violence initiates and culminates the criminal justice process. The criminal defendant
finds her violent action reflected back upon her in handcuffs, in courtrooms, and in
prison cells. Murder begets execution. The destruction of another ends in the
destruction of the self. On a social level, violence stains and purifies. Both the
outlaw’s threat and the State’s justice are accomplished through corporeal
destruction. How then can an identical act—the taking of life—be both lawful and
unlawful in disparate circumstances? The answer has to do with perception. Violent
meanings are shaped by the actors who perpetrate violent action, the audiences who
perceive such action, and the arenas in which this action is performed. Violence’s
legality—the perceptual and tangible distinction between crime and justice—is an
interpretive project. This Article investigates the ways by which these interpretations
are distributed and channeled. Its purpose is to reveal the processes that render
discrete violent acts lawfully justified.
Physical violence of the type at play here can be sorted into two general
categories: illegal and legal. Illegal violence involves the range of proscribed behaviors
whereby one common citizen inflicts bodily harm upon another. These actions
comprise the substantive content of the criminal common law and are perceptually
recognizable as illicit. The lay name given to the behavior is frequently identical to
criminal charge.21 Legal violence, in contrast, describes a set of harmful actions
committed by state officials against common citizens to achieve some social function.
Not only are the actions considered lawful, but they are understood as governance.
Violence is so intrinsic to governance that its harmful content is taken for granted.22
The State, subject to a few exceptions, exercises a monopoly over these forms of
violence, including, but not limited to, capital punishment, bondage, and police
force.23
20
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22
23

See Sergei Klebnikov, Journalists Targeted While Covering Protests: 328 Press Freedom Violations and
Counting, FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/sites/sergeiklebnikov/2020/06/04/journalists-targeted-whilecovering-protests-279-press-freedom-violations-and-counting/?sh=66bc3c0e184f (last updated June 6, 2020,
1:32 PM).
Words such as murder, rape, assault each describe an individual behavior and a criminal act. As such, it is
difficult to perceptually separate the action from the attendant criminal sentence. The very word implies
illegality.
Cover, supra note 1, at 1610 n.22.
Certain criminal defenses, such as self-defense, are violent actions committed by lay citizens rather
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Legal violence is an exercise in state legitimacy. Legitimacy derives from
shared understandings. Although the State maintains a monopoly power over the
forms of legal violence, its expression is limited—particularly in liberal societies—by
the people it governs. As Robert Cover recognizes, “[t]he imposition of [legal] violence
depends upon the satisfaction of social preconditions for its effectiveness.”24 Legal
violence, then, is best understood as the dialectic product of state-public dialogue.25 To
punish lawfully, the State requires popular recognition of the modes and technologies
by which it punishes—recognition that is informed by both parties. Existing state
practices, normalized over time, help shape the contours of what the public can
recognize as legitimate. But broader community sentiment also conveys which
practices the public is willing to accept. The State must transmit violence in ways
that the public understands and acknowledges as proper, tolerable, and lawful.26
Should the State exceed the bounds of what the public deems acceptable, it risks loss
of legitimacy. When state legitimacy is threatened, so too is state monopoly over
legal violence.
Aesthetics, symbols, and rituals are central to this project. By deploying
recognizable systems of meaning, the State can more readily classify which violence is
lawful and which is not.27 The public perceives these systems as familiar and can
contextualize them amongst existing conceptions of justice and legality. Here, the
courtroom is a paradigmatic example. By channeling violence—even death—through
courts of law, the State communicates that it is acting within legal bounds. Each
aspect of the adjudicative experience is meant to reinforce public recognition of the
courtroom medium. Elaborate formalities and ceremonial procedures evoke the twin
emotions of respect for the law and hatred for the criminal aggressor.28 The physical
space is composed in a way that amplifies state power.29 Judges and prosecutors
speak in the language of moral rhetoric, phrase issues in emotive terms, and conjure
community feelings against the accused.30 Each aesthetic signals to the public that
the State’s procedure—regardless of the violence inflicted—is a legitimate exercise of
power. Repeated performances of these procedures over time serves to reinforce
normative perceptions of legality.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the dialectic process of legal violence is

24
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than state officials. Still, violence of this type must be ratified by state actors before being rendered
lawful.
Cover, supra note 1, at 1616.
See GARLAND, supra note 14, at 22.
The instrumental use of penal measures for control purposes is always in tension with social
and psychological forces which place clear limits upon the types and extent of punishment
which will be acceptablein any specific situation. The principles of discipline and power—
knowledge techniques may provide a technology of control with a given logic and potential
but the extent to which it is used, and the purposes to which it is put, will depend upon
wider social and cultural forces.
Id. at 189.
Id. at 198. (“Punishment, then, can be viewed as a complex cultural artefact,
encodingthe signs and symbols of the wider culture in its own practices.”).
See George Herbert Mead, The Psychology of Punitive Justice, 23 AM. J. SOCIO. 577, 585–87 (1918).
See generally Costas Douzinas, The Legality of the Image, 63 MOD. L. REV. 813, 813–30 (2000) (explaining how
the legal system organizes image, symbol, and empty space to augment its own power).
GARLAND, supra note 14, at 90.
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dynamic. Shifting sensibilities set the stage for recalibration. Forms of legal violence
that were once widely accepted may become taboo as community values evolve and
change. The scaffold, for instance, has yielded to the execution chamber. Vengeance is
no longer a tolerable justification for state-sanctioned punishment—criminal
sentences are meted out in more polite forms.31 Today’s violent regime operates
through technologies of concealment. The State renders violent punishment
acceptable—and therefore lawful—by obscuring the violence of its own action.
Through this concealment project, the State communicates that it is
reasonable, civilized, and tolerant. Its violent aesthetics are constructed to be
consistent with prevailing social mores. The following sections explore this process at
work within the two paradigmatic forms of state violence: capital punishment and
police killings. In each, state force is conveyed as reactive and necessary, reserved
only for the socially repugnant and morally irredeemable. Even then, the violence is
anesthetized. Pain, autonomy, and even humanity, dissolve to the background. These
processes reinvoke the “truth” of living in a more rational and advanced moment in
social history.32 The victim, the killer, and the killing act are each cloaked in different
robes.
II. THE CONCEALMENT TECHNOLOGIES OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
Capital punishment is the quintessence of lawful violence. It is the purest form
of force the State may bring against an individual. The death penalty is also
quintessentially American.33 Despite its abolition in twenty-three states, capital
punishment remains a salient feature of the American legal experience.34 For four
centuries, the death penalty has been deployed as a highly ritualized, deeply symbolic
practice, designed to reinforce state values through the eradication of disfavored
outsiders. As commentators have noted, the practice has evolved over time. Part A
traces the history of the American death penalty, outlining its development from
public spectacle to private procedure. Part B describes how capital punishment
operates in modern society, specifically how contemporary practices function to
disguise the violence of state execution.

31
32
33

34

Id. at 84.
Martschukat, supra note 13, at 55.
Not only is the United States one of the last remaining nations to employ capital punishment, its use aligns
with our individualist ethos. As Judith Randle explains,
[s]upport for the death penalty also resonates with the historically individualistic paradigm
through which Americans perceive human behavior. Partly a derivative of the ‘American
Dream’—that success comes to anyone who works hard enough—upon which the United States
was founded, and partly due to decontextualized, merciless portrayals of criminals—particularly
within law and order politics—Americans believe that criminality stems from individual evil
rather than societal conditions thatshape individual choices.
Judith Randle, The Cultural Lives of Capital Punishment in the United States, in THE CULTURAL LIVES OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 92, 92–95 (Austin Sarat & Christian Boulanger eds., 2005).
Seventeen individuals were executed in 2020, ten of whom at the hands of the federal government. See The
Death Penalty in 2020:Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Dec. 16, 2020),
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/dpic-reports/dpic-year-end-reports/the-death-penalty-in2020- year-end-report.
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A. History
In May 1691, Jacob Leisler was publicly executed for leading an insurrection
against British colonial authorities.35 Spectators gathered, amidst falling rain, to
witness Leisler executed in the manner prescribed: hanged “by the Neck and being
Alive their bodys be Cutt downe to the Earth and their Bowells be taken out and they
being Alive, burnt before their faces; that their heads shall be struck off and their
Bodys Cutt in four parts [sic].”36 The crowd—stirred to frenzy by the violent display—
cut Leisler’s garments into small pieces to divide amongst themselves and keep as
relics.37 Although Leisler’s execution was particularly sensational, scenes like this
were not uncommon in colonial America. Early capital punishment was intended as a
type of public theater.38 Acquiring a near-religious quality, these ceremonies took the
character of morality plays—designed to glorify sovereign authority and stir public
passion against the condemned. Criminal processions began at the jailhouse,
advanced through public streets, and culminated at the town square.39 Dying
speeches were common affairs—the scaffold reproduced the stage.40 Through these
spectacles, the State sought to deter and instruct. On an individual level, audiences
witnessed the consequences of proscribed behaviors and learned the path of righteous
living.41 More abstractly, public executions were “to be interpreted as ritualized
answers to the evil in the world and as reproductions of the social structure in a
divine order.”42
American execution procedure underwent a broad transformation in the
nineteenth century.43 Revolution in punitive method was largely brought about by
pragmatic and legitimacy concerns. By the early 1800s, audience participation had
grown chaotic and unpredictable.44 Public executions began to more closely resemble
public festivals than they did solemn rituals. These events were increasingly
characterized by drunkenness, merriment, and petty criminality.45 In other instances,
public executions seemed to lead to psychic destruction, inspiring more violence than
they deterred.46 Scholar Annulla Linders aptly demonstrates this phenomenon
through the story of Levi Kelly, “a man of respectable connections [who] had never
35

36

37
38

39

40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Rob Warden & Daniel Lennard, Death in America Under Color of Law: Our Long, Inglorious Experience with
Capital Punishment, 13 N.W. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 194, 202 (2018).
Id.; see also JOHN D. LAWSON, AMERICAN STATE TRIALS: A COLLECTION OF THE IMPORTANT AND INTERESTING
CRIMINAL TRIALS WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE UNITED STATED FROM THE BEGINNING OF OUR GOVERNMENT
TO THE PRESENT DAY 517 (1914–1936).
LAWSON, supra note 36, at 517.
See Steven Wilf, Imagining Justice: Aesthetics and Public Executions in Late Eighteenth-Century England, 5
YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 55 (1993); see also Linders, supra note 16, at 616–21.
Dwight Conquergood, Lethal Theatre: Performance, Punishment, and the Death Penalty, 54 THEATRE J. 339,
344–45 (2002).
Id.; see also Wilf, supra note 38, at 55.
See Martschukat, supra note 12, at 54.
Id.
Linders, supra note 16, at 607.
See id. at 618.
Id.
Id.
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been distinguished for immorality of any kind.”47 “Less than two weeks after Kelly
had witnessed an execution, he killed an acquaintance, and was promptly condemned
to death.”48 A spectator at Kelly’s execution then hanged himself the same night.49
These unintended responses revealed an interpretive fracture between the State’s
message and public understanding.
Moreover, the State found itself under increased pressure from liberal reform
movements. Rises in industrialization, capitalism, standards of living, and rational
ways of thinking combined to lower the public tolerance for violence.50 This cultural
transformation—incorporating Enlightenment values, such as tolerance and
rationality—had rendered public displays of violence regressive and uncivilized. The
prevailing punitive methods were falling behind the times. Linders deftly summarizes
the shifting zeitgeist:
By the mid-nineteenth century, however, brutality had become a liability
and visible pain a sign of failure . . . the emergence of a humanitarian ideology
and new middle-class sensibilities, ma[de] blood and agony intolerable elements
of the execution . . . the expansion of science, br[ought] efficiency, proficiency,
and rationality to the heart of the execution ritual.51 To maintain its violent
regime, the State had to find new, rational ways to kill. As a result, executions
were removed from the public square and relocated within jailhouse walls.52 By
privatizing—indeed, concealing—capital punishment, the State recalibrated
legal violence to match public sentiment.
B. Concealment Technologies
We are still in the age of concealment. Indeed, much of the debate on capital
punishment during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries debate has centered on
finding more perfect methods to obfuscate the violence done.53 As capital punishment
is the most extreme and irrevocable manifestation of legal violence—because the
State cannot negate the violence of execution—the concealment project takes on
special salience. Viewed another way, capital punishment exists on the far periphery
of public tolerance. The State faces greater pressure to overcome normal aversions to
pain and death.54 Perfect displays of force require perfect obfuscation. The following
subsections describe the ways the State conceals capital punishment and the
perceptual ramifications of such concealment.

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
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Id. at 619.
Id.
Id.
Randle, supra note 33, at 94.
Linders, supra note 16, at 630.
Conquergood, supra note 39, at 343.
Recent death penalty decisions have been largely occupied with defining the contours of rational killing. The
companion cases Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005)
jostled over the minimum age requirement. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) and Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) grappled with the issue intellectual disability.
See Cover, supra note 1, at 1622.
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i. Spatial Concealment
The most straightforward of the State’s concealment project, spatial
concealment, describes the physical removal of incarcerated bodies from the public to
the private sphere. Displaced from the town square, capital punishment is now meted
out behind the closed doors of the execution chamber.55 The death sentence is no
longer public affair. In the most literal sense, violence is concealed.
Spatial relocation has had significant interpretive effects. First and foremost,
private executions convey state rationality. As indicated above, concealed executions
are closely tied to the reform and progressive movements of the nineteenth century.56
Changing sensibilities communicated that the public would no longer tolerate grisly
spectacles. Execution rituals were cast as degenerate—the hallmarks of primitive and
uncivilized cultures—not processes characteristic of an enlightened State.57 In
concealing the execution process, the State sought to match the new liberal zeitgeist.
Indeed, by punishing rationally, the State conveyed that it was itself a rational,
progressive actor.
Privatizing execution also provides the State with greater control over audience
composition.58 The ability to curate spectator populations has alleviated pragmatic
and hermeneutic concerns. Prison walls afford the State a right to exclude—a
gatekeeping discretion that could not be enforced in the town square. As a result, the
character of execution audiences has become less democratic. Spectators now
comprise only a small network of state actors.59 Monopoly control over the execution
environment not only ensures orderly procedure; it diminishes the likelihood of
perceptual error. The smaller—and less hostile—the audience, the greater success of
the state’s intended messaging. The general public is no longer present to interpret
the killing act in unexpected and inadvertent ways. Reduced transparency permits
legal violence to proceed unquestioned.
Spatial concealment further obscures state violence by dividing sentencing and
execution into public and private realms.60 By publicizing the trial, and concealing
death, the State draws public attention entirely to legal ceremony. Doing so places
enormous symbolic magnitude on the courtroom ritual—the judge bears responsibility
for legitimating the killing act to the viewing public.61 But the courtroom is also the
interpretive arena over which the State exercises vast control.62 Rules of procedure
and evidence dictate which cases and information are allowed to reach the public.
55

56
57
58
59
60

61
62

See Jen Kirby, Photos: A Haunting Look at America’s Execution Chambers, N.Y. MAG. (May 16, 2014),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2014/05/haunting-photos-of-us-death-chambers.html.
See Martschukat, supra note 13, at 55.
See id. at 56–57.
See Linders, supra note 16, at 613–14.
See id. at 614.
The penal process of modern societies has become a fragmented, differentiated sequence of
events, in which certain aspects are subjected to close public scrutiny and involvement, and
others are left to the management of professionals who, for the most part, maintain a low
visibility and control their own information output.
See GARLAND, supra note 14, at 89.
Cover, supra note 1, at 1622.
GARLAND, supra note 13, at 86.
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Tradition and decorum mediate this information in specific and intentional ways. In
bifurcating the sentence and execution, the State prevents the public from
interpreting the violent act—the execution evades scrutiny. Instead, public
interpretation is limited to a courtroom performance curated to communicate its own
legitimacy. Witnessing the validation for the violent act, rather than the act itself,
naturalizes the State’s justice.
Spatial displacement also conceals the humanity of the criminally accused.
Public aversion to violent action has inadvertently resulted in the abstracting of state
force. Despite the macabre nature of execution spectacles, these performances
retained a human element. Ritual processions and dying speeches impressed the
defendant’s personality upon execution audiences.63 Spectator response was then
informed by the individual—certain defendants might provoke contempt while others
elicited sympathy. These individuated responses bespoke an awareness of what the
execution act was doing—namely, destroying a human life. By privatizing capital
punishment, the State complicates that awareness. Spatial concealment transforms
the human body into a nameless, faceless abstraction. Extricated from
contemporaneous witness, the criminal defendant is stripped of her human
characteristics—she is rendered tabula rasa. This sanitizing process, in turn,
amplifies the defendant’s susceptibility to narratives of criminality and personal
responsibility. The result is a more tolerable killing act—the justified death of an
abstract being.
Finally, removing execution from the public eye obstructs the public’s ability to
empathize with the condemned. Pain, in some sense, is already uncommunicable.64 It
is so personal a feeling that the individual in pain becomes unable to convey her
experience with those around her. This incapacity is only intensified by concealment.
By locating executions behind prison walls, the normative realities of the free public
and the death row inmate are irreconcilably fractured. Concealing pain destroys the
public’s ability to comprehend the inmate’s experience in any meaningful sense
because there is no experiential referent by which it can relate. The inmate’s
experience transcends public imagination. Without shared understanding, the public
may begin to question whether this pain and death exist at all. Are people killed, or do
they simply disappear?
ii. Pain Concealment
Capital punishment’s second concealment technology implicates the evolution
of execution procedures over time. While executions were originally intended to
accentuate suffering, the modern State has sought progressively “humane” ways by
which to kill.65 From the firing squad, to the electric chair, to lethal injection,
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Conquergood, supra note 39, at 345.
Whatever pain achieves, it achieves in part through its unshareability, and it ensures this
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anterior to language, to the sounds and cries a human being makes before language is
learned.
Cover, supra note 1, at 1602–03 (quoting ELAINE SCARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN 4 (1985))
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advancements in violent methodology have worked to obscure the pain inherent in
state displays of force.
Like the physical relocation of capital punishment, transformation in execution
procedure was in part catalyzed by changes in public sentiment. Especially gruesome
execution methods became associated with the medieval and unreformed—the primal
expressions of unevolved states.66 To preserve its violent monopoly, the State had to
adapt its killing instrumentalities to more appropriately reflect the rationality of the
era.67 What transpired was a sort of arms race in anaesthetized killing technology. In
the late nineteenth century, New York state empaneled a three-member death
penalty commission tasked with discovering a more humane method of execution.68
The recommendation was electrocution.69 Unlike hangings, which were often
susceptible to botched procedure and user error,70 the electric chair was the killing
tool for an enlightened age.71 Through sophisticated machinery, specialized
knowledge, and careful preparation, electrocution was capable of killing scientifically
and instantaneously.72 The electric chair became the nation’s chosen method of
execution.73
Over a century later, we have arrived at an execution process that eliminates
nearly all sensory output. Lethal injection mimics a medical procedure.74 Chemical
compounds silently usher the condemned from life to lifelessness.75 No violence is
heard or smelled—it can barely be seen.76 This hushed process renders killing
dreamlike and unreal.
The near-perfecting of rational killing technology has had perceptual
ramifications. Through pain concealment, the State has reframed execution as a last
necessity rather than a sadistic prerogative. Pre-modern violent spectacles reveled in
agony—it was precisely through the physical destruction of the body that the state
achieved its deterrent ends.77 Sensationalized violence served as a public warning, a
didactic instruction on state power and behavioral norms. Lethal injection realigns
this narrative. Now, only the most heinous offenders are put to death through only
the most lenient means.78 The absence of criminal suffering communicates the
absence of state celebration. This partially explains why botched executions cause
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such public discomfort.79 Failed procedures signal return to an unreformed era. The
public will tolerate lawful execution, but it will not tolerate suffering.
In a related way, pain concealment legitimates lawful violence by framing the
State as merciful. Modern capital punishment seems to play with conceptions of
proportionality— execution methods are tolerated when they appear less lurid than
the underlying criminal act. Although the State still punishes crime with death,
sensationless violence is perceived as less severe than the unlawful violence of
gunshots and stabbings. The painlessness of lethal injection is juxtaposed against the
innocent victim’s suffering—an interpretive process that conjures impressions of
humane paternalism. The State aligns execution technology with the more merciful
methods of euthanizing animals rather than the disordered violence of human
killing.80 And like animal euthanasia, the individual death relieves suffering and
preserves the health of the collective.
iii. Written Concealment
The third concealment technology examines the role of the judicial opinion in
disguising state violence. A highly malleable form, the written opinion obscures the
human aspects of criminal defendants through omission and manipulation. Because
the judicial opinion becomes the public record for capital punishment, it plays an
indispensable part in justifying lawful violence.
On its surface, the judicial opinion is meant to provide an objective account of
an individuated adjudicatory result. The form is both descriptive and explanatory. In
the criminal context, it recounts the factual scenario that leads to prosecution and
provides the legal justification for the judge’s verdict. But the legal opinion is also a
narrative medium.81 Judicial texts tell stories and these stories impart moral
instruction. Beneath its objective veneer, the opinion is susceptible to partiality and
obfuscation. The form, substance, and language of the judicial opinion serves to
further the State’s concealment project.
Text necessarily suppresses image. While this appears as an obvious
statement, its hermeneutic consequences are worth deeper exploration. The judicial
opinion is not a contemporaneous broadcast, but an ex post rendering. The reader
neither witnesses the criminal act nor sees the courtroom. Instead, her understanding
of the adjudicative event is shaped entirely by the judge’s words—she must imagine
both the crime and the trial through judicial language. This necessarily reduces the
range of interpretive outcomes. Even the most comprehensive written account will fail
to convey the quantity of emotion, detail, and meaning made possible through visual
observation. Image begets information, and the absence of image results in
evidentiary withholding. Readers are neither able to perceive the defendant’s face, nor
gauge her reaction to sentencing. Courtroom interaction is lost, and with it, legacies of
79
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See Ed Pilkington, Outcry after Oklahoma Prisoner Vomits and Convulses During Execution, GUARDIAN (Oct.
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bias and hostility. The public is shielded from the defense lawyer’s apathy or the
defendant’s incapacity to communicate with the court in any meaningful way.
Mitigating factors such as remorse, fear, and youth disappear from the judicial
narrative.
The State’s written concealment project is augmented by the opinion’s
substantive content. Not only does the written text eschew image, but judicial
opinions often omit physical descriptors that help contextualize and explain punitive
decision making. This process has a depersonalizing effect. Stripped of bodily
dimensions, defendants come to resemble stock characters in crime narratives rather
than distinct human lives. The judge may also choose to emphasize or omit a
defendant’s behavioral and environmental characteristics. A common technique is to
highlight the defendant’s past criminal history but withhold legacies of personal or
structural hardship that may help explain recidivism.82 The criminal act is portrayed
as the product of intrinsic failure or deviant morality rather than as a response to
external stimuli. Even the most destitute and desperate victims of society are deemed
to be free, equal, and autonomous actors.83 Such decontextualized analysis frames
capital punishment as proportional to the underlying crime. In a vacuum, it is simple
calculus to punish death with death. Presumed to control their own destiny, these
defendants are understood to deserve whatever violence the state imposes. On the
other hand, the judge may stress environmental factors to associate the defendant
with known criminal tropes. In this way, judicial opinions fashion a sort of ecological
criminality where the defendant’s surroundings produce and explain her actions.
Situating the defendant within gang narratives or “high crime areas”84 serves as an
instructive example. Finally, the opinion may sustain attention on the crime victim’s
sympathetic character. By depicting the victim as benevolent or socially productive,
the judge casts the defendant as a sub-human foil.85
Linguistic techniques play a role as well. As stated above, judicial opinions—
especially at the lower court level—are ostensibly objective documents meant to
memorialize the facts and reasoning behind a particular legal outcome. Appellate
court judges are more likely to use the opinion as an occasion for symbolic
pronouncements, but the text is still meant to belie subjectivity.86 Claimed objectivity
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Within this strange world of the court-room, individuals come to be seen as legal subjects,
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is enhanced by the third-person narration in which judicial opinions are
predominantly written. The essence of third-person narration is the disembodied
storyteller—she describes events from an omniscient vantage point. Such narrative
framing conceals the fact that judicial opinions are written by individual state actors
with particular commitments.87 As a result, the judge as individual is perceptually
attenuated from the opinion as legal command. She is left free to smuggle personal
biases, character judgments, and political choices under the guise of objectivity.
Moreover, opinions are written in such a way as to augment the inevitability of the
judge’s own decision.88 High rhetoric weaves judicial choice to notions of eternal truth
and justice.89 Judges also use the past selectively, creating contexts and histories that
render judgment—and the defendant’s fate—preordained. These linguistic factors
combine to naturalize the conception of the law as omnipotent. The opinion is no
longer created by a particular state actor but appears written from the perspective of
the law itself.
In contrast, linguistic techniques work to frame the criminal defendant as a
subjective, autonomous actor. The manipulation of active and passive voice draws
attention to certain behaviors while obscuring others.90 Criminality is emphasized
through grammatic construction—the defendant “acts” while the victim is “acted
upon.” Such techniques highlight the defendant’s agency.91 She is given near-complete
power to shape the textual landscape, each subsequent event emanating from her
initial lawless act. Where criminal behavior is framed as personal choice, criminal
sentences become a personal responsibility.
iv. Temporal Concealment
Capital punishment proceeds in two acts: the State sentences; the State
executes. In today’s criminal justice apparatus, these acts are temporally distanced.
An inmate may spend a lifetime on death row, enduring successive appeals, before
ultimately being put to death. This is a strategic process—the State conceals violence
through the manipulation of time.
The temporal separation between the death sentence and the execution diverts
attention from the killing act. Whereas a simultaneous—or temporally close—
pronouncement and execution would accentuate state power, separating the two
diminishes the immediacy of violence. A break in time provides a cooling period.
When a defendant is condemned to death, the public understands that the execution
will not take place until years, maybe decades, down the line.92 Daily existence
assuages collective tension. Future violence is discounted, the value of life abstracted.
As time passes, the public may become distracted or focus on other matters. Even
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where the sentence is flawed or unjust, the public understands that the defendant
will be given opportunities to rectify judicial error.93 Temporal spacing paves way for
appeals, stays, and habeas petitions. These proceedings are diversified across a broad
range of courts and judges— often implicating both the state and federal systems—
and ensure that no single actor is wholly responsible for the death sentence.
Redemptive chances and super due process94—even where functionally meaningless—
communicate rationality and fairness.
v. Institutional Concealment
Today’s execution is a choreography of legal violence. A constellation of state
actors each assume a different role in the sentencing, imprisonment, and execution of
the criminal defendant.95 This institutional design assuages internal tension,
aggrandizes state power, and communicates rationality.
The division of “execution labor” serves an important psychic function.
Institutionalization diffuses responsibility. By fragmenting capital punishment into
component parts, state actors can separate themselves from the killing act.
Coordination is the hallmark of our criminal justice apparatus.96 The judge sentences
but does not execute. The prison guard executes but does not sentence. Each
individual is charged with a range of duties narrow enough to either deny
responsibility for the killing act or to delegate that responsibility to others. More
abstractly, attenuation from the killing act provides opportunities for role
distancing.97 This phenomenon describes a central reality of professional action,
which “characterizes the distance between the individual and the role”—the
difference between doing and being.98 The “‘individual does not deny the role, but
rather the possible self, which the role implies for all role-holders.’”99 Put differently,
the judge may necessarily cause death as a condition of governance, but he is not a
murderer. The ability to separate action from personal essence assuages psychic
tension. Through these cognitive processes, state actors conceal violence from
themselves.
Coordination also enables state actors to perform violence in the first instance.
This clarification is important because individuals are not born state agents. Rather,
state actors often retain mainstream sensibilities—such as an aversion to violence—in
their personal lives. To overcome these inhibitions, an actor’s autonomous self must
be subordinated by “agentic” behavior.100 The behavioral shift arises in hierarchical
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settings, where learned obedience transcends the capacity to act autonomously.101
Division of labor facilitates this process. Orders and signals from institutionally
legitimated authorities suppress the individual distaste for violence.102 Whereas
responsibility for the entire act may be intolerable to discrete actors or may stoke
internal dissent against a violent system, obedience numbs deviant impulses. 103 The
state actor comes to view herself as the instrument for carrying out the orders of a
higher authority and therefore no longer sees herself as responsible for her actions.104
The moral burden of the act is externalized to the higher authority. The guard takes
her cue from the judge, and the judge from the law itself.
Institutionalization has a disorienting effect on both the criminal defendant
and the public audience. Because no single person is entirely responsible for the
execution, it becomes difficult to discern the locus of power behind the killing act. The
judge, warden, guard, and defendant each share in the violence inflicted.105
Execution, then, does not appear as the discrete act of a particular individual, but as
the faceless process of an omnipotent State. This serves two functions. First, it
amplifies state power. The criminal defendant is cast as an individual actor against a
collective and impersonal force, a relative framing that accentuates the futility of the
defendant’s position.106 Alone in a world stacked against her, the defendant’s only
rational choice is to succumb to State discretion. Second, it legitimates lawful violence
in a modern era. Institutionalization imbues execution with meaning. Similar to the
electric chair, the institutional scheme replicates modern values associated with
liberal societies, including efficiency, technology, and mass production.107 As such, the
division of execution labor communicates rationality by reducing the appearance of
arbitrariness. Each state actor becomes a vital cog in a just system. This
interpretation is juxtaposed against citizen violence, which is framed as the
meaningless product of discrete bad actors—human frailty contrasted against the
rational machine.
Finally, as coordinated execution is institutionalized and repeated, it becomes
naturalized. The same qualities that amplify state power obfuscate the public’s ability
to reform and reimagine the system. As time passes, the public forgets that execution
is the product of interplay between the State and the community, reflecting a political
choice. Institutionalization hides that these processes are subject to change.
III. THE CONCEALMENT TECHNOLOGIES OF POLICING
Capital punishment is not the only regime of state violence that obscures the
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violence of its actions. Police killings have been endemic in American life for nearly as
long as judicial executions.108 Although lacking the rhetorical and ritual symbols that
work to justify death sentencing, police violence has also been legitimated by way of
concealment. This is accomplished through proceduralization, instantaneity, and
narrative.
A. Proceduralization
Police violence is camouflaged by language. It operates lawfully under different
names.
In our criminal industrial complex, a police killing is neither murder nor
manslaughter; it is the “use of deadly force.”109 Semantic reinvention is perceptually
effective. Different words conjure different meanings in the public mind. Redefining
police violence allows the State to cognitively separate law enforcement killings from
violent common-law crimes. But reframing police violence transcends verbal
deception. The linguistic shift has produced a new legal/occupational standard—one
that permits civilian killing without adjudication or due process.110 This is a
tremendous power. It exceeds even capital punishment, which requires judicial
sanction from a network of state decisionmakers. The State has legitimated this
power by establishing it as an occupational and professional procedure.
Use of force is bureaucratic.111 It is described in training manuals, instilled at
police academies, and interpreted by reviewing courts and agencies. Like other
occupational procedures, it is frequently reanalyzed and applied in new contexts. This
standard, in substance and through the process by which it is defined, renders the
justificatory threshold for police killings far below that of civilian crimes.
Substantively, the current regime establishes a set of environmental circumstances
and procedural steps that authorize lethal force against a civilian.112 So long as the
officer satisfies these criteria, she is vindicated in taking a life.
Regarding process, the prolonged attention by judicial and executive agencies conveys
that the State, as a purported rational actor, takes the problem of police violence
seriously. This concentration on lawful justification also naturalizes a perceptual
reframing. Public focus is redirected from the violent action toward the professional
standard. This is important, of course, because the standard is self-determined and
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self-imposed. The State decides entirely which behaviors constitute lawful action and
which do not. In doing so, it creates a tangible realm of individual violent behavior
removed from criminality. The standard becomes self-reinforcing. Officers who toe
the justificatory line are vindicated in the eyes of the law. Officers who stray too far–
triggering public disapproval—can be written off as aberrant—acting exclusively
within the criminal realm. In both cases, the use of legal violence is never questioned.
The public’s attention is not on whether the officer killed an individual, but whether
she deviated from the occupational standard.
Similarly, “use of deadly force” conceals the officer’s autonomy.113 On a personal
level, lethal decision-making is easily redirected toward the professional standard,
which is shared across law enforcement and reinforced by the legal regime. So long as
the officer stays within the lawful realm, she was simply “doing her job.”114 The
decision to use force, then, is not a personal choice but an occupational necessity
mandated by the State. Framed as such, the officer may easily refer back to common
narratives.115 She may have been acting in self-defense to an imminent social threat.
She may express personal distaste for violence but believe that its necessity
transcends individual feeling. She may even disclaim the autonomous self entirely,
representing the violent act as reflexive, instinctual, or imperative. Each justification
obscures the officer’s agency. This process protects the officer so long as she operates
within lawful bounds. When officer violence is justified by the prevailing professional
standard, she was acting, not as an individual, but as part of the state machinery. In
contrast, officers who transgress the standard are deemed personally responsible and
sacrificed to the criminal justice apparatus. The system preserves itself.
Finally, this regime of legal violence derives meaning from violent lawlessness.
Juxtaposed against civilian criminality, the bureaucratic standard is conceived of as a
procedural response to irrational and immoral behavior. Again, the ability to
monopolize and reproduce rational behavior, to approximate mass efficiency, signals
legitimacy to the public. More interesting, however, is that lethal force may be
legitimated through its continued use. One would assume that the frequency of police
killings would erode state control over lawful violence. Perhaps counterintuitively,
killing legally may serve to fortify the state monopoly over force. Through “use of
force,” the State has recognized a right to violence. Like any right, its contours are
strengthened and defined by repeated exercise over time.116 As legitimate “use of
force” is found in new contexts, the State’s ability to kill lawfully—indeed, to conceal
the violence of its action—is further engrained into the legal conscience. Each case is
contextualized against past killings and sets precedent for future ones. The conditions
for lawful violence are constantly rediscovered in novel environments, enlarging the
factual scenarios where police may justifiably kill. As a result, police killings appear
as an unchangeable legal reality.
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B. Instantaneity
Unlike capital punishment, where the symbolic pronouncement and violent
action are temporally distanced,117 police killings happen instantaneously. In this
context, however, immediacy enhances the State’s ability to commit and conceal
killing. Executions are concretely tied to adjudication, which serves as the public
justification for the killing act. The adjudication then must shoulder the burden of
rendering death sentences intelligible to public audiences.118 Temporal distance
assists this project because it attenuates and abstracts the violence inherent in the
judicial command. As time passes, the public may focus on other concerns,
understanding that the defendant will proceed through a lengthy appeal process
before the execution is rendered final. In contrast, police traditionally operate without
the presence of large public audiences or the fear of being documented.119 Because
police violence frequently happens off-script, there is no need for the complex systems
of symbols and methods used to rationalize capital punishment. Absent these
constraints, law enforcement is afforded greater latitude for state killing and greater
opportunity to justify these killings ex post facto.
The concealment technology of instant killing is evidentiary control. Sudden
and immediate force creates an informational void. The contemporaneous perception
of a particular action is confused, distorted, and even destroyed within the
emotionally fraught landscape of violence. At its most extreme, the police killing of a
criminal suspect eliminates the possibility of counter-narrative. Criminal defendants
are afforded process. Even if there is little chance for acquittal, criminal defendants
are given the opportunity to recount their experience before a court of law.120 The
taking of life results in the absence of story. Without the victim’s narrative, the State
can better control the history of the encounter. This effect is amplified when the
killing occurs outside third-party observation. In these circumstances, the officer’s
perspective is the only remaining source of information. The State may omit,
embellish, or generate facts necessary to render the killing lawful.121
Even where there are witnesses, instantaneous killing provides avenues for
evidentiary manipulation. Immediacy breeds confusion. As police violence is often
sudden and undocumented, there is less certainty surrounding the actual
circumstances of the encounter. The State uses chaos to its advantage, deploying selfpreserving narratives to fill informational gaps.122 These accounts may spotlight the

117
118
119

120

121
122

See supra Section III.B.iv.
See Cover, supra note 1, at 1622.
But see Nicol Turner Lee, Where Would Racial Progress in Policing be Without Camera Phones?, BROOKINGS
(June 5,2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/05/where-would-racial-progress-in-policingbe-without-camera-phones/.
Although criminal defendants are not required to testify at their own trials, the Sixth Amendment provides
generally that criminal defendants have the right to be informed of the nature and cause of their accusation,
to be confronted with witnesses against them, to have compulsory process in obtaining witnesses in their
favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for their defense. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Instantaneous
killings deprive the accused of these safeguards.
See Hirschfield & Simon, supra note 90, at 172.
Id.

2022]

Revealing Violence

103

defendant’s criminal history or frame the officer’s action as self-defense.123 Structural
access to media sources then provides opportunities to disseminate those narratives to
broad audiences.124
Where law enforcement evidence conflicts with witness evidence, the State
emphasizes its own legitimacy to minimize dissenting voices and obfuscate the truth
of the matter. Individual accounts—particularly where perception or character is
flawed—are unlikely to carry the day against the State. This power imbalance is
amplified where both the victim and witness belong to a marginalized or
disempowered group.125
Optics can also work in the State’s favor. Police-encounter killings are rarely
observed from start to finish. Because many people trust law enforcement, third
parties that arrive late to the confrontation may presume that the defendant has
acted unlawfully and deserves his fate. Pushed further, certain visuals conjure
criminal meanings in the mind of the viewing public.126 The police chase, for example,
signifies that the victim is attempting to evade the law rather than escape a personal
danger.127 Race—of both the witness and the witnessed—also complicates
perception.128 Common narratives of black criminality work to tilt the justificatory
presumption toward law enforcement.129
C. Narrative
The most prominent method of police concealment is narrative. Through the
production and distribution of police mythology,130 the State frames police killings as
the paradigm of popular justice. These stories are familiar. The police officer is
alternatively conceived as hero, proceduralist, and necessary vigilante.131 She is
simultaneously reactive to proactive threats and the avenger of innocent victims and
fallen comrades. Such narratives congeal in the public mind, framing the police as
indispensable guardians of social order.
Even before the production of myth, the State obscures police violence through
disseminative control. State actors have temporal and professional access to
information and information distributors.132 Police officers and agencies are
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necessarily the first—or among the first—parties to learn of citizen killings.133 This
provides the State with two distinct advantages. First, law enforcement may frame
events in a positive light before other parties have a chance to learn of and interpret
the act.134 Opposition narratives therefore must not only be plausible—they must
discount or discredit the original. This additional burden works in favor of state
legitimacy. Second, early knowledge establishes a gatekeeping power. As stated
above, police may be the only surviving source of information. Even where there are
contemporaneous witnesses, those individuals may be difficult to track down or afraid
of reprisal. Other entities, such as the press, then become reliant on official sources
for informational access.135 The State can then curate and disseminate narrative
content as it sees fit. For example, “[p]ursuant to administrative rules, police often
withhold names and identifying characteristics of officers involved in civilian
deaths.”136 “Journalists who cannot identify officers are . . . prevented from probing
their character and background.”137 Because the public may “have positive images of
police, [audiences] may . . . associate faceless officers with a timeless and benevolent
social role.”138 Omitting an officer’s personal characteristics also conceals her
individual responsibility for the killing act. Instead, the faceless officer reifies
conceptions of the omnipotent state. The police killing ceases to be the product of
individual choice, proceeding instead as a collective state function. Official sources
may conceal the name and personal characteristics of the criminal victim as well.139
This also serves a dehumanizing role, but in a different way. Because the public may
harbor negative images of criminals, it may be less able to conceive of them as
complete individuals. Excluding personal information from the narrative transforms
the victim into a subhuman type.
As journalists become increasingly reliant on official sources for information,
they may be more willing to frame state actors in a favorable light to maintain
professional relationships.140 Newspaper and electronic accounts reproduce many of
the same linguistic techniques that judges do in written opinions. These stories omit
images, manipulate active and passive construction, and employ euphemisms to
sanitize violence.141 Exceeding even the judicial opinion, the press may manipulate
narrative point of view to enhance state legitimacy. Police are imagined as
protagonists in hard-boiled crime stories.142 Criminal victims are their monstrous
foils. Each of these factors combine to render the State’s narrative to be the definitive
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account of a police killing.
Substantive narratives also play an integral role in concealing police violence.
Beyond disseminative control, myths inform popular perception of law enforcement by
imagining police killings as lawful and justified. One popular narrative imagines the
police as hero. Framed in opposition to the criminal type, the officer represents a
benevolent force, risking personal harm to safeguard the community. The “thin blue
line” is a popular iteration.143 In this narrative, law enforcement is assigned with
protective responsibility for all of civilized humanity. Police officers represent the last
and only bastion separating social order from criminal anarchy.144 Where law
enforcement ceases to exist, or becomes too weak to effectively function, the delicate
social ecosystem disintegrates. This narrative divides humanity into three types: the
innocents, the criminals who threaten their safety, and the officers who eliminate
those threats. Viewed in this light, police killings are not only justified, they are net
positives. While the criminal’s death may be unfortunate, it becomes necessary to
protect innocents from lawless violence. Moreover, innocents are assigned more value
than criminals, thus justifying police killings by way of utilitarian calculus. Of course,
the “thin blue line” hardly reflects an objective reality. Various other social conditions
work to maintain order, including education, aversion to violence, and the hegemonic
effect of the law. Human beings eschew typology and are instead colored by race,
class, and sexuality.145 This latter point reveals the narrative’s tendency toward
elitism and bias. Still, the myth has achieved popularity in American culture.146
Another version of the police hero narrative centers on the human qualities of
individual officers. Positive portrayals work to redeem the officer from the killing
act.147 The policeman may have killed the criminal victim but is otherwise considered
to be a “good cop,” “family man,” or “pillar of the community.”148 Violence becomes a
narrative outlier—at odds with the individual’s essential character. It is then more
difficult to assign malevolent motive to the officer’s action. This myth often works in
tandem with the conception of police as proceduralist. The professional police officer
employs deadly force within legal parameters, deriving legitimacy from adherence to
the established standard.
Where officers fail to act as either heroes or proceduralists, their actions may
be justified by a darker narrative. Some demographics believe that the judiciary fails
to effectively correct criminal behavior and protect society from criminal danger.149
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Judicial inefficiency then legitimates alternative methods of crime control—namely
the vigilante policeman. Subscribers to this narrative understand that the death
penalty has decreased in frequency or is increasingly reserved for the most heinous
offenders. Diminution in execution results in both under enforcement and under
punishment.150 As a result, an entire criminal subclass evades proportionate
retribution. Police killings fill these punitive interstices.151 It does not matter if the
officer acted on heroic impulses or within legal authorization because he nonetheless
performed a beneficial social function. Police killings work to redeem a society
corroded by crime.
Finally, police violence is justified through narrative framing. Police killings
are cast as reactive instead of proactive, reinforcing the impression that officers had
no other choice than to resort to deadly force.152 This conceals the fact that lethal
encounters can frequently be the result of police provocation.153
IV. VIOLENCE REVEALED
The punitive landscape is becoming visible. Viral images of police killings have
undressed state violence and restored it to the forefront of public consciousness.
Seemingly each week, a tragic new video circulates on social media and enters
American homes, ripe for interpretation.154 The result is a perceptual watershed.
State violence had been detached from its expressive channels, and without
expressive control, the State cannot limit the range of interpretive meanings. The
public is free to contextualize viral videos within a limitless backdrop of preexisting
knowledge—and the association is lawlessness. These images denaturalize the regime
of legal violence because they convey criminal meanings. Scenes depict racial terror,
random and arbitrary decision making, and abuses of power—characteristics
ostensibly absent from a rational criminal justice system. In short, violence is
perceived for what it is—violence. The State’s panoramic concealment project is
unable to suppress these images or redeploy them through a legal medium. As such,
the understanding between the State and the public regarding the use of legal
violence is threatened.
Perhaps the most salient way that viral images upset the State’s concealment
project is that they are broadcast publicly. Widespread dissemination of state killing
contravenes the nineteenth-century paradigm shift in punitive methodology. Public
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hangings were deemed regressive and socially unacceptable in the 1800s.155
Community intolerance has only amplified after years of concealment and
institutionalization. Execution scenes are now unrecognizable to the American
mainstream. Outside fictionalized, foreign, or historical accounts, there is little with
which to contextualize executions as just or legitimate. Compounding misrecognition,
today’s public executions are aggravated by technological advancements. Whereas
nineteenth-century spectacles were confined to city squares, viral images are
distributed instantaneously to global audiences. Twentieth-century civilians who may
have never witnessed a single discernible act of state force are now repeatedly
exposed to police killings, as they are a regular staple of the daily news cycle.156 The
character of state violence is more public than it has ever been.157
It is true that police killings have traditionally occurred in the public realm,
but they have often played out chaotically and without spectators. Even where
observers were present, witness accounts were delegitimated through procedural
standards, evidentiary manipulation, and narrative.158 The ability to control
information sources—to trade in confusion—allowed the State to skew violent
interpretation in its favor. Today, confusion is mitigated by modern mediums. Social
media and mobile recording devices have democratized the ability to portray state
violence.159 The result is market intervention—the State is now forced to compete
with viral distributors for disseminative control. New diversity in distributive sources
has multiplied the amount of violent content available for public viewing, and this
additional content fills evidentiary gaps. Mobile phones record the contemporaneous
actions of police officers and immediately distribute them to public audiences.160
Whereas police killings may once have destroyed any counter-narrative, viral
recordings preserve the original encounters for collective interpretation. For the first
time in recent history, the public audience receives state violence unmediated.
Viewers are then able to pause, rewind, and repeatedly view the scenes. The oncechaotic encounter is now susceptible to analysis and deconstruction, allowing the
public to more freely assign responsibility for violent action. Even still, viral
distributors are able to distort content through their own aesthetics, redeploying
public understandings against the State.161 Through content cutting, editing, and
manipulation, these subjective accounts subvert state legitimacy by enhancing the
criminality of police action.162
Viral scenes also restore humanity to state violence. The State’s concealment
project has operated to suppress image and audience. Suppression, in turn, has
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enabled private executions and judicial texts to depersonalize criminal defendants.
These processes abstract human qualities and replace them with criminal narratives,
destroying the possibility of public empathy. In contrast, viral images reintroduce the
human face to killing acts. We see victims of police violence experience fear, express
regret, and plead for mercy.163 They are returned to their personal and environmental
backdrops—recolored with identity. We learn their names and listen to their families.
Even pain reenters the arena—the sensory deprivation of rational execution
technology upended by acute, visual agony. We feel the scene’s tension crescendo to
climax, hear gunshots, and see blood. Victims of state violence no longer live in the
realm of abstraction. The public understands that the human toll is very real.
Viral images also reveal the human face of the executioner. Law enforcement
officers can no longer conceal their identities behind procedural rules and narrative
control.164 Through image, the public can quickly match thumbprint to trigger finger.
When officers are identified, their actions can be studied and contextualized. Often,
police perpetrators are discovered to have personal legacies of bias and misconduct—
histories of excessive force that seem to render killing inevitable.165 Law enforcement
then ceases to be the impersonal arm of a powerful state and is instead a collection of
individuals predisposed to violent choice. And this individualization reveals the
irrationality of state force. We see that legalized violence is not always the product of
a coordinated and orderly apparatus but is instead the arbitrary decisions of
empowered individuals—individuals proactive and vindictive in their actions. Victims
are stripped of process, juries, criminal appeals, and all the other trappings of
coherent justice.
When arbitrariness is exposed, so, too, are the myths of autonomy and
proportionality. Victims of state violence are frequently dispossessed of the very
agency later claimed to justify their punishment. Instead, they are targeted for their
identity rather than for their participation in criminal behaviors.166 Personal choice is
removed entirely from the equation—whether they engaged in social deviance
becomes irrelevant to their executioner. And even where victims do exhibit evidence
of criminality, the magnitude of punishment far exceeds the harm. The State does not
simply discipline murder with death. Pawned cigarettes and forged checks receive

163

164
165

166

See Lucy Tompkins, Here’s What You Need to Know About Elijah McClain’s Death, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/who-was-elijah-mcclain.html (explaining that McClain’s death received
significant attention partly due to his final words, which were captured on body cam audio, during which he
apologized and expressed empathy for the officers even as they continued to restrain him).
See supra Part IV.
See Erin Corbett, The Officers Who Killed George Floyd Have Done This Before—Many Times, REFINERY29
(May 29, 2020, 4:33 PM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2020/05/9846650/minneapolis-police-derekchauvin-history-force; Darcy Costello & Tessa Duvall, Former Detective Brett Hankinson Faces 3 Charges After
Breonna Taylor Shooting, COURIER J., https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/local/breonnataylor/2020/09/23/what-we-know-about-officer-brett-hankison-indicted-in-breonna-taylorshooting/5490411002/ (last updated Sept. 23, 2020, 6:42 PM).
See generally Jeffrey A. Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police Killings, 100 B.U.
L. REV. 951 (2020).

2022]

Revealing Violence

109

identical sentences.167 So, too, does innocence.168 With concealment subverted, the
public perceives the State as exceeding the social contract on punishment.169 The
result is communication breakdown between the State and the public.
V. FRACTURED RESPONSE
Unsurprisingly, unveiled state violence has had a destabilizing effect in
American society. Each stakeholder—public, state, and law enforcement—has moved
to exercise dominion over violent action and representation. Public response has been
prodigious. Viral distribution of police violence has catalyzed an unprecedented wave
of demonstration. In the summer of 2020, immediately following George Floyd’s
death, Black Lives Matter protests mobilized upward of twenty-six million people
across the United States.170 The protests have been diverse and intersectional,
incorporating groups across race, gender, and class divides.171 These figures would
make the protests the largest movement in the country’s history.172 As viral images of
police violence continue to disseminate, demonstration has become a common
expression of public life.
Mass demonstration has also amplified calls for radical action. The public has
not simply voiced an intolerance for isolated incidents; it is demanding institutional
overhaul.173 Endemic police violence has inspired demands for police defunding and
outright abolition—reform initiatives that would have been considered unthinkable
ten years ago.174 These measures envision the reallocation of state resources toward
social infrastructure.175 Police budgets frequently occupy a disproportionate amount of
state discretionary spending.176 Progressives argue that funds could be spent more
effectively and less violently. Reinvesting in affordable housing, drug rehabilitation,
and mental health counseling reflects alternative ways of deterring crime.177 More
ambitious reformers demand the wholesale dismantling of the police apparatus.178
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Believing law enforcement to be a tool of racial subordination, they understand
modest reform as merely treating symptoms of a much larger disease.179 Abolitionists
seek to eliminate the root conditions of violence through community empowerment,
thereby transcending the need for violent policing.180
The State has largely resisted these efforts. Instead, public upheaval has
resulted in increased efforts to restore punitive legitimacy. As monopoly control of
force is threatened, the state has resorted to terroristic and forcible displays of
punishment.181 This response has manifested in two ways. First, the State has
increased the use of capital punishment.182 In July 2019, the Department of Justice
reinstituted the death penalty after a two-decade absence.183 A year later, both during
and after the protests, the federal government commenced an unparalleled wave of
executions. The ten inmates put to death that year were the most since 1896.184
Second, the State has militarized in response to public activism.185 Protestors in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Portland, Oregon, have been met with the National
Guard.186 The ensuing clashes resulted in violent crowd-control measures, citizen
injuries, and extraconstitutional detentions.187 These responses sought to quell public
unrest and rechannel violence through legal mediums.
Law enforcement has had a unique reaction to viral distribution of police
violence. During protests, officers have turned their attention toward journalists and
bystanders, attempting to censor dissemination through shows of force.188 Individuals
reporting on and recording police activity have been beaten, pepper sprayed, and
shot with rubber bullets.189 These incidents can be read as law enforcement
attempting to exercise control over punitive aesthetics.
Perhaps no situation better reflects the current legal terrain than the death of
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Andrew Brown Jr. in Elizabeth City, North Carolina. During the writing of this
article, Brown was killed by police officers in what is alleged to be an execution-style
shooting.190 The uncertainty surrounding the lethal encounter has ignited a legal
battle over the public release of officer body- cam footage.191 The State, as of this
writing, has only disseminated a short clip from a single deputy’s camera; between
seven and eight deputies were said to be at the scene.192 It is expected that law
enforcement will release more video in the coming days.193 Anticipating that new
footage will reveal police misconduct, the mayor of Elizabeth City has declared a state
of emergency.194 Its prophylactic measures include increasing law enforcement
presence and establishing a citywide curfew, curtailing the public’s capacity for
protest. 195 Indeed, narrative justifications for the shooting have also begun to spread.
In the days since Brown’s death, media sources have obliquely tied Brown to criminal
drug trafficking, discounting his humanity and redirecting attention away from state
violence.196 Brown’s case is a microcosm of stakeholder response. The State struggles
to suppress what the public demands to interpret.
CONCLUSION
Suffice it to say, the regime of legal violence is unstable. Naked violence has
summoned state force to the interpretive battleground. Punitive methods, long
accepted and long obscured, are today at the forefront of public concern. As viral
images express state violence outside concealment technology, the line between
justice and criminality is blurred. Violent meanings merge in the public mind,
subverting the perceptual divide between legitimate and illegitimate use of force.
Where it once stood firm, the legal reality of state violence is collapsing underfoot.
And as with any tectonic shift, there is collateral damage. Attempts to reestablish
control over state violence, and the various ways it is expressed, has resulted in
tangible harms. Demonstrations are the visible products of power struggle. The State
does not easily surrender its control of force, nor its ability to curate violent aesthetics.
These are matters of life and death.
But regime instability also provides sightlines to new legal realities. It is
through deconstruction—through perceiving flaws in the prevailing state of things—
that just futures are built. Without discounting the human toll, this Article argues
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that the public should see the current moment as a paradigm shift in state punitive
relations. The nineteenth century revolution in violent method provides a useful
illustration. Where execution spectacles outlasted their efficacy, the public demanded
modern, rational expressions of state violence. Now, it appears state violence has
outlived rational meaning. How could it be otherwise? Despite the complex machinery
that perpetuates and preserves lawful force, objective, lucid violence has always been
fiction. Killing is never impersonal—not to the person. The ability to perceive state
violence clearly, to understand its tendency toward arbitrariness and incoherence,
transforms the legal imagination. Violence revealed denaturalizes violence’s
necessity. Laid bare before us, we can properly confront the moral and political
foundations of state force and question the purposes it serves. The time has come to
reconsider the lawful use of violence.

